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Abstract
Background: Proliferation and expansion of security risks necessitates new measures to ensure authenticity and
validation of GMOs. Watermarking and other cryptographic methods are available which conceal and recover the
original signature, but in the process reveal the authentication information. In many scenarios watermarking and
standard cryptographic methods are necessary but not sufficient and new, more advanced, cryptographic protocols
are necessary.
Results: Herein, we present a new crypto protocol, that is applicable in broader settings, and embeds the
authentication string indistinguishably from a random element in the signature space and the string is verified or
denied without disclosing the actual signature. Results show that in a nucleotide string of 1000, the algorithm gives a
correlation of 0.98 or higher between the distribution of the codon and that of E. coli, making the signature virtually
invisible.
Conclusions: This algorithm may be used to securely authenticate and validate GMOs without disclosing the actual
signature. While this protocol uses watermarking, its novelty is in use of more complex cryptographic techniques
based on zero knowledge proofs to encode information.
Keywords: GMO security, Limits of watermarking, Zero knowledge proofs, Verifiable encryption for GMO
Background
The dramatically increasing worldwide utilization of
genetically modified plants, animals and microbes
(GMOs) presents challenges to ensure security, authentic-
ity and validation of material goods and legal agreements.
Similarly to the evolution witnessed in internet protocols,
strategic focus is required to anticipate, track and address
potential infringements of GMO security. It is imperative
that unimpeachable protocols assure product ownership,
provide data to track the product supply chain, and to
preempt malicious attacks especially related to bioagents,
such as weaponized anthrax spores. As GMOs are not
tamper proof or invulnerable to outside attack, it is neces-
sary to encode and embed cyber-security data within the
GMO genome. An ideal GMO based security mechanism
should provide a secure authentication process accessible
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to relevant parties without revealing the specific signa-
ture components to outside parties. Watermarking has
been used extensively to establish authentication signa-
tures that validate ownership by providing a mechanism
to conceal and recover the required data necessary to
authenticate the identification signature of the origina-
tor [1–4]. However, in watermarking applications, the
identity of the authentication information is disclosed as
validity is verified [5–11]. Although these methods would
be useful under many scenarios, they are unacceptable in
the context of sophisticated GMO security because they
would fail under concerted attack based on malicious
transfer and signature duplication. For example, Clelland
et al. [5], although establishing significant message
secrecy, does not protect the key decoding signatures after
access by a third party. It also appears that their approach
would be best suited to small message concealment
because the DNA based message length must be similar
to that of the background sonicated genomic DNA (ca
50-150 nucleotides). Ideally, the signature should not be
transferrable, and should remain concealed even from
third parties utilizing the cryptographic code. Integrating
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this sophisticated cryptographic modification is crit-
ical for sustained next generation security of GMOs.
A focused adversary should only be able to speculate
whether a given sequence of nucleotides is a random
sequence or a valid signature sequence. Considering a sce-
nario where an attacker might seek to modify a GMO or
weaponized bioagent in order to adversely affect function,
coercion of individuals having information components
or even alignment of whole genome sequences from target
and wild type stains via BLAST or other programs should
have an extremely low probability of identifying and/or
validating an authentic signature. Clearly any security
approach also must align with prokaryotic and eukaryotic
GMO development and application technologies.
In this paper we demonstrate a novel algorithm that
addresses these concerns using advanced cryptographic
techniques. For every signature string generated, the
developer generates a populating subset with fake sig-
natures (a random sequence of nucleotides of the same
length as a valid signature). Thus, each clone would con-
tain adequate information for identification whether or
not it is a signature carrying clone. The valid signature
can be established by techniques developed in [12] and
would be available to the developer and/or third party
inspector. Those techniques assure that the input infor-
mation is correctly received on the output side, i.e. when
they are stored and read out there is no loss or change
of information, while there is no concern that someone
would actively modify or manipulate the data. Since each
clone contains a valid or fake signature element, it would
be virtually impossible to correctly select the authen-
tic signature. We emphasize that while our algorithm
uses watermarking, it is not a watermarking protocol per
se. The process of watermarking by itself does not pro-
vide adequate security during its verification as it allows
potentially malicious transfer and signature duplication.
Our protocol uses sophisticated novel cryptanalytic attack
models and protection mechanisms. While many of the
existing methods use classic cryptography such as sym-
metric - AES, nonsymmetric -RSA and more classical
approaches, we use zero-knowledge and confirmer signa-
ture techniques applied to GMOs. These are much more
advanced crypto systems than AES and RSA. This algo-
rithm should become the standard in implementation of
this technology in practice.
Comparison with other work
Practical realization and combination with data-encoding
mechanisms into DNA
Embedding of data in DNA has received a lot of attention.
Previous algorithm proposals primarily concerned about
biological aspects and correct and efficient decoding. Hei-
der and Barnekow [13, 14] focus on error detection and
correcting properties - not in the sense of cryptography -
but inside the genome, to detect and correct mutations
occurring during cell division that might destroy the infor-
mation that is ’encrypted’ (i.e., hidden), inside the genome.
As such the DNA medium can be interpreted as a noisy
channel and has been addressed by tools of digital cod-
ing and information theory [11]. Depending on usage
requirements in living cells, our watermarking step might
benefit from such additional features and could easily
be combined with theirs or related algorithms. Yachie et
al. [15] considered error detection and correction of the
data-encoded DNA sequence inside of living organisms.
Their approach is a refined repetition code that avoids
multiple segments of the same DNA sequence within a
single genome. Our method can be combined with their
alignment-based DNA-data storage and retrieval method,
or any of the sequence alignmentmethods. In fact, we pro-
pose a modern alignment method with provably secure
decoding properties in [12].
However, no attention has been placed on the crypto-
graphic aspect of the problem. In particular, in the case
of ownership watermarks, biocompatibility along with
the correct and efficient encoding is not enough. The
embedded information that is stored and retrieved addi-
tionally requires specific cryptographic security require-
ments unique to this situation. It is imperative that
the secret key remains hidden during watermark veri-
fication to prevent the unintended copying of signature
data or specified information. These are independent
cryptographic security considerations established in this
paper.
Clarification about utilization of cryptography
In contrast to correctness of encoding and decoding and
efficiency, cryptography considers the security aspects of
a (digital) communication medium. These security con-
cerns are unique to the DNA setting. An example can be
seen work by Gibson et al. [16] who established the syn-
thesis and assembly of a synthetically designed bacterial
cell. Watermark sequences are included which distinguish
the synthetically designed from naturally occurring DNA
and cells. This type of watermark does not yield unique
ownership in that watermark verification is only done by
multiplex PCR and the entire watermarking procedure
could be imitated by others. They were not concerned
about cryptographic security features, e.g., if someone
were to produce a harmful bacterial clone carrying their
watermark information. How would they refute this clone
was not theirs?
Haughton and Balado [11] first incorporated a secret
k to keep the encoding secret. The key is shared only
between an encoder and decoder. This has the advantage
that only the encoder and decoder will have knowledge
of the secret message that is embedded in DNA. In the
context of ownership watermarking, unfortunately, this
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scenario is not fully satisfactory. It requires that verifica-
tion of the watermark is only possible to a selected list of
decoders which has to be determined prior to embedding
the watermark. Once the watermark is placed, the water-
mark verification process is only possible within this fixed
set of users. In the case of verification of a watermark own-
ership to a user outside of this fixed set, this scenario is
not applicable.
Heider and Barnekow [13] suggest to integrate sev-
eral private and public key cryptographic algorithms, by
employing encryption or a one-time pad. Both are done
to create a short binary message. Although the authors
did not make this explicit in their work, the first obvi-
ous advantage of this approach is that by doing so the
information to be hidden inside the DNA is now scram-
bled inside a binary string. However, it is imperative to
note that they do not utilize any of the mentioned cryp-
tographic algorithms. What is needed for DNA-Crypt is
a plaintext message (the information to be hidden inside
the DNA) that is efficiently converted to a binary string.
Thus, they correctly argue, that any function, mapping, or
algorithm, which takes meaningful input and coverts it to
binary, can be used for their purpose. Their main concern
is only the output binary string. They do not incorporate
any cryptographic features. They do not consider secu-
rity, cryptographic approaches, or utilize encryption and
decryption. In fact, they argue that the keys used for these
cryptographic algorithms could be exchanged with other
users. However, precisely for private key crypto, keep-
ing the keys secret is the most important requirement to
ensure security. Clearly, their concern is not to utilize the
mentioned algorithms for their cryptographic features,
but mainly to generate a binary string. Their concern is
for better storage utilization, and hence, the cryptographic
integration is only for compression purposes of text data
into binary (source compression into binary). In summary,
all that is utilized by DNA-Crypt is a binary encoding
table [14].
In summary, while data embedding methods have bene-
fited from numerous disciplines of digital communication
theory, unique requirements of cryptography and security
requirements are first addressed in this work. It is crucial
to note, that our work can seamlessly be combined with
previous data embeddingmethods. Balado-Haughton [17]
determine the maximal number of ways that DNA water-
marking can be done, by considering it as a special data
hiding problem. Their basic requirement is the primary
structure preservation achieved via the redundancy of
the genetic code. This does not lead to a unique solu-
tion. Depending on biocompatibility constraints and other
practical considerations, the tagging of DNA can be per-
formed in various ways. We have not focused on length
requirements of the signature sequence, how easily the
signatures can be inserted and read, as our method can
easily be combined with any others that focus on such
issues.
Our work complements these proven practical realiza-
tions, can easily be combined with related successful in
vivo experiments to hide the secret information in non-
coding regions, and addresses the missing security issues
not considered before.
Each of [11, 13–16] use some watermarking as a means
to ensure tracking or ownership of DNA or organism.
Table 1 gives a comparison with our work.
Methods
The basic cryptographic building block is defined as a
zero-knowledge (ZK) proof of knowledge [18] of a hidden
signature to constitute the designated confirmer signature
[19]. ZK proofs are both convincing and yet yield no iden-
tifying key code information beyond the validity of the
assertion being proved. They are typically used to force
malicious parties to behave according to a predetermined
protocol.
The specific cyber-security protocol is as follows: Let 
be a digital signature scheme given by its key generation
protocol .keygen which generates a key pair .sk and
.pk consisting of the secret and private key for the sig-
nature generation and verification protocols, respectively.
Let  be a cryptosystem described by .keygen that gen-
erates the pair (public key = .pk, private key = .sk)
to be used for encryption and decryption. Classes and
properties required for  and  suitable for designated
confirmer signatures have been described and analyzed in
[19, 20]. To give a specific example,  will be represented
by a suitable RSA signature scheme and  by ElGamal.
The Full Domain Hash RSA [21] signature scheme 
is given by the key pair (.pk=(N , e), .sk = d) where
N is an RSA modulus and ed ≡ 1 mod φ(N). The keys
Table 1 Comparison with other work
Feature [11] [13] [14] [15] [16] Our method
Added security features in
addition to the sequences
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no no no no no yes
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here are those used by the signer. With all computations
in Z∗N , a valid signature σ on a message m is defined via
σ = H(m)d, where H is a public hash function. The ver-
ification equation will make use of the following one-way
function and image
f (x) = xeand I = H(m). (1)
Importantly, f is homomorphic as for all x, y ∈ Z∗N ,
f (xy) = f (x)f (y).
For the encryption scheme  we use ElGamal’s encyp-
tion [22]. It operates in a group (G, ·) =< g > of large
enough order where computing discrete logarithms to
base g is difficult. The confirmer’s secret key is .sk = x
and the corresponding public key is .pk = y = gx. To
encrypt a message m ∈ G, one chooses a random r and
computes the ciphertext as the pair E(m) = (gr ,m ·yr). To
decrypt a ciphertext (K1,K2), one first obtains the session
key k = Kx1 = yr and then computesm as K2 · k−1.
Let ◦, the binary operation defined on G × G, be the
term-wise product (a, b) ◦ (c, d) = (ac, bd). Fundamental
for the construction is the fact that ElGamal is homomor-
phic since [20],
E(m) ◦ E(m′) = (gr ,m · yr) ◦ (gs,m′ · ys)
= (gr+s,mm′ · yr+s) = E(mm′). (2)
The space of signatures produced by  must be the
same as the space of messages encrypted by . This can
be done as follows: the signer chooses two sufficiently
large primes p and q such that p′ = (p − 1)/2 and q′ =
(q − 1)/2 are prime. The signer sets N = pq and chooses
g ∈ Z∗N such that (with overwhelming probability)
QN = {a2 : a ∈ Z∗N } ⊆< g >⊆ Z∗N and sets G =
QN . The signatures produced by  are mapped into G
by squaring all the parameters (even the bases) before
performing any modular operations with them. We also
assume that the respective keys are verified with a cer-
tificate authority and the respective public parameters are
publicly accessible. The symbol || will denote the opera-
tion which when applied to two strings m and z results in
the ‘usual’ concatenation of the stringm, and the string z.
The individual steps of our cryptographic protocol are
described next. Let the given message m be the signature
data to be signed. Throughout, if m is given in its binary
representation (quartic representation as DNA), then after
appropriate parsing m ∈ ZN (m ∈ G) is considered to be
the representation of the integer m modulo N (in G). The
signer first generates a verifiable signature μ on m using
the following steps:
(1) The signer chooses r R←−Zp′q′ and computes z ←− gr
in G.
(2) The signer uses his secret key .sk = d of RSA-FDH
to compute σ = H(m||z)2d.
(3) σ is converted into DNA bases via our watermarking
protocol below and hidden inside the GMO.
(4) The signer encrypts σ via ElGamal with the
confirmer’s public key .pk = y = gx and the
random r, E(σ ) = (K1,K2) = (gr , σ · yr).
(5) μ = (K1,K2) is stored in an electronic database as
the designated confirmer signature of m.
A candidate signatureμ ofm from a public database can
only be validated by the TTP according to the following
verification protocol.
(1) Given m and μ = (K1,K2), the confirmer computes
σ as the decryption of the ElGamal ciphertext
(K1 = z,K2) using the secret key x.
(2) The confirmer verifies if σ is a valid RSA-FDH
signature ofm||z by testing σ e = H(m||z)2 using the
signer’s public key e.
(3) The signature μ is accepted as valid if and only if this
verification step passes.
Therefore, the algorithm runs as follows:
(1) Determine the number of occurrences Ni of each
codon Ci in the host genome, see e.g. [23].
(2) Determine the numberMj of binary triplets Bj in the
given binary sequence (with filling in of mock
elements to yield a number of characters divisible
by 3).
(3) LetN = {A,C,G,T} be the set of nucleotides. There
are 24 ways in which these can be ordered. Let n1, n2
be the first two nucleotides, and n3, n4 the latter two
in an arbitrary ordering.
(4) Associate with each triplets Bj of a given binary string
a set of possible codons Cj, B1 	→ {n1n1n1, n1n1n2,
n1n2n1, . . . , n2n2n2}, . . .B8 	→ {n3n3n3, n3n3n4,
n3n4n3, . . . , n4n4n4}, where the associated codon list
excludes the ATG start codon [11].
(5) The number of times each text triplet is represented
by each associated codon Cj is determined according
to the following: For each Bj determine the number
of occurrences Nj of each of the eight codons Cj that
is associated to Bj via the above mapping. Spread out
the Nj occurrences of each Bj according to match the
individual numbers of occurrences of their associated
codons Cj.
Results and discussion
The main difference between confirmer signatures and
ordinary electronic signatures based on watermarking
techniques is that confirmer signatures are not self-
authenticating. Our algorithm is essentially based on
the confirmer signature concept. In this case, the entity
requiring proof of authentication (the “verifer”) cannot
check the ownership or the validity of a signature unless a
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legitimate party confirms or disavows it [24, 25].While the
original signer (the originating product owner, developer
or a delegate) can confirm the signature, it also may be
verified by a semi-trusted third party (TTP) “confirmer”
[26]. There are several advantages to limiting signature
validation access to the confirmer and verifier. First, it
protects the signer against coercion. Second, it protects
the buyer if the signer becomes unavailable. Third, it vali-
dates the authentic signature without disclosing the actual
signature sequence to an adversary who may even mas-
querade as a verifier. While the constant involvement of
a TTP in the cryptographic protocol gives more power to
the TTP, it also enables the TTP to obtain and disclose
the signature in case of dispute and has additional impor-
tant forensic implications. Following successful protocol
implementation, the verifier and TTP have certifiable
validation that the GMO contains a specific identifying
signature although the verifier never acquires the exact
signature [20].
Specifically, the confirmer and/or signer provides a ZK
proof to demonstrate the validity of this signature to the
verifier (Fig. 1). A valid signature is not accepted without
the confirmation protocol, and a falsely alleged signature
can only be repudiated via the denial protocol. In Figs. 1
and 2, the prover is either the confirmer of the signature
who can undo encryption via ElGamal with the knowledge
of the private key, or the signer who wishes to confirm the
validity of signature μ. Thus, signature verification can be
established by the signer without the involvement of the
TTP. The TTP has the ability to undo ElGamal encryp-
tion and is the only party who can obtain the signature σ .
Signature verification is therefore solely based on the
encrypted signature μ = E(σ ), not the signature σ itself.
In case of dispute the TTP can make σ public, convert it
into nucleotides, and determine presence in the GMO.
Step 4 in Fig. 1 requires a protocol for proving that a
given ciphertext under ElGamal decrypts to a given mes-
sageM. The general building block is termed the proof of
equality of two discrete logarithms [27, 28]. Adapted to
our context, this protocol runs as depicted in Fig. 2. This
protocol can be modified into a ZK proof of knowledge
(ZKPOK) protocol by augmenting the Fig. 2 process by
steps (2)–(4) of Fig. 1 [20].
It is important to note that a signature cannot be veri-
fied solely from identification of a unique sequence string.
With our algorithm, as opposed to standard watermarking
methods, a signature is not accepted as valid without the
cooperation of the prover or delegate through the crypto-
graphic confirmation protocol. Hence, even if an attacker
detects a candidate signature, its validity is known only
to the legitimate verifier who interacts with the prover
in the protocol. Without the prover, no party can deter-
mine whether σ is a valid signature for m or not. Sim-
ilarly, the specific denial protocol process ensures that
a certain string cannot be denied by the original signer
as an invalid signature. The protocol provides objective
Fig. 1 ZK proof of knowledge to verify authenticity. The prover and verifier are given the public input, an alleged signature (K1, K2) = μ with
z = K1, and the message (signature data)m. If μ = E(σ ) is generated as above, then t1 = (s′ · σ)e and t2 = (gs+r , s′σ · ys+r) where s is the
randomness used in ElGamal to encrypt s′ , and r is that used to encrypt σ . In this case, the protocol allows the prover to confirm the signature in ZK.
If μ is a falsely implied signature, the protocol allows the prover to deny the signature in ZK
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Fig. 2 Proof that (K1, K2) is the encryption of the given messageM under ElGamal. If the prover can successfully answer two distinct challenges
c1, c2 with two acceptable answers s1, s2 then the verification step results in ys1−s2 = Wc1−c2 andgs1−s2 = Kc1−c21 (see [27]). Thus, if c1 − c2 < p′q′ a
value r exists such that r = logyW = loggK1 = (s1 − s2)/(c1 − c2) mod p′q′ . Consequently,W = yr , K1 = gr , and K2 = Myr . This proves that (K1, K2)
is indeed an encryption of the messageM under ElGamal that can be translated into a ZKPOK according to [20]
certifiable authentication of ownership as the signature is
retrievable and verifiable by designated parties, e.g. the
TTP. The TTP may disclose the signature for verification
by other parties although normally, the company’s sig-
nature data remain completely hidden. The ZK property
ensures that no one has access to the signer’s secret key or
the signature. Even if the buyer or a masquerading adver-
sary analyzes via genome sequencing individual GMO’s in
a population, the secret key or the signature that allows
them to impersonate the verifier cannot be discovered.
The protocol ensures that the signature string is indis-
tinguishable in the electronic signature space as rep-
resented by integers [20, 29]. In conjunction with the
signature protocol we developed a watermarking algo-
rithm that is designed to provide signature invisibility.
The protocol consists of converting the cryptographic
signature σ into the DNA alphabet such that it is indis-
tinguishable from the endogenous DNA after insertion
in the genome. The algorithm effectively camouflages the
required authentication and/or tracking data to ensure
that an adversary cannot identify the signature as a
security or watermarking feature. The process also is
reversible. From the nucleotide sequence, the signature
can be translated to cryptographic code. The algorithm
encodes binary triplets based on the frequency of each
codon as determined by the codon bias of the host. Codon
bias refers to each organism’s inherent preferences of
certain triplet nucleotides for translation into correspond-
ing amino acids. Our approach is solely DNA based and
does not require transcription or translation of sequences.
Alignment of the message with the host codon bias is
designed to better hide the message in the genomic back-
ground. Each binary bit is assigned to a choice of two
specific nucleotides ni ∈ {A,C,G,T}, i.e. 0 	→ n1or n2,
1 	→ n3or n4 to mirror the codon frequencies of the host
with the frequencies of the binary text triplets. Figure 3
shows the correspondence between the binary text triplets
Bi and DNA codons Ci for the specific example where
n1 = A, n2 = C, n3 = G, n4 = T . Each of the text
triplets is distributed over the associated codon triplets so
that the resulting representation resembles the codon bias
of the host genome. Further improvement can be made
by renaming and reordering, as the choice of the ni is
arbitrary. Renaming the codons by matching the obtained
string with the host frequency distribution results in a
correlation of the obtained with the host frequency distri-
bution of typically 0.98 or more.
Therefore, each of the binary triplets is represented in
terms of their associated codons according to the num-
ber of occurrences. Figure 4 shows the correlation to the
overall E. coli genome codon frequencies that is obtained
when an arbitrarily chosen binary signature of length 1000
is represented in terms of DNA nucleotides as determined
by our algorithm.
Following design and construction of the entire
nucleotide array encompassing the message and algo-
rithm components, there are numerous approaches to
incorporate the construct stably in the target organism
using standard biotechnological tools for prokaryotes and
eukaryotes.
Conclusions
Our protocol is provably secure in terms of stan-
dard cryptanalytic tools, and integrates advanced elec-
tronic signature methods with a new watermarking or
data-embedding technique, yielding a highly secure and
authentication-based product. Importantly, the authen-
tic signature is indistinguishable from random elements
in the signature space and the authentication string can
be confirmed or denied without disclosing the actual
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Fig. 3 Correspondence between the binary text triplets Bi and DNA codons Ci for the specific example where n1 = A, n2 = C, n3 = G, n4 = T . Each
of the text triplets is distributed over the associated codon triplets so that the resulting representation resembles the codon bias of the host
genome. To demonstrate the watermarking protocol, assume there are 44 occurrences of 000 in the binary text and that the codon frequency
values as determined from the entire codon frequency distribution, are: AAA, 3.3 %, AAC, 2.1 %, ACA, 0.8 %, ACC, 2.3 %, CAA, 1.5 %, CAC, 0.9 %,
CCA, 0.8 %, CCC, 0.6 %, covering a total of 12.5 % of the total codon distribution. Among the codons assigned to 000, there are 100 · 3.3/12.5 =
26.6 % for AAA, 17.1 % for AAC etc. Consequently, we assign (26.6 · 44)/100 ∼ 12 occurrences of 000 to AAA, 8 to AAC, 3 to ACA, 8 to ACC, 5 to CAA,
3 to CAC, 3 to CCA, and 2 to CCC, covering the total 44 occurrences of 000
signature. The signature data are not strictly limited in
sequence size and may include, but are not limited to,
security details, the product production and distribution
chain and company licensing details. The resultant data
are used as input to establish the security signature in
binary according to an algorithm that yields a corre-
sponding string with a nucleotide distribution that closely
reflects the natural codon bias of the given host genome.
The resulting sequence construct may be inserted into
the GMO genome using established genetic engineering
Fig. 4 Representation of the correlation between codon frequency
distribution produced via our watermarking algorithm and the initial
codon distribution of the host genome (y-axis). The watermarking
algorithm generates a signature indistinguishable from the rest of the
genome. The x-axis here is 100 randomly generated binary signatures
of length 1000 mapped to the codon frequency distribution of the
individual codons in E. coli
technologies such that it is stably inherited through gen-
erations. Further increasing the security level can be
accomplished by inserting the authentic signature into a
subset of the GMOpopulationwith the remaining popula-
tion containing imitation signatures. Authentic signature
clones may be identified via PCR by the legitimate owner
of the signature or by a designated judge. Importantly,
the signature key allowing decoding and authentication
is not revealed during this process, thus allowing con-
tinued utilization of the key. This provides an increased
level of security against whole-genome sequencing and
alignment that might increase the probability of identify-
ing a security signature with other standard watermarking
approaches.
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